War and State Formation: A Mennonite Critique by Joireman, Sandra F.
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Political Science Faculty Publications Political Science
2004
War and State Formation: A Mennonite Critique
Sandra F. Joireman
University of Richmond, sjoirema@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/polisci-faculty-publications
Part of the Christianity Commons, and the Political Science Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Political Science Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joireman, Sandra F. . "War and State Formation: A Mennonite Critique." Christian Scholars Review 33, no. 2 (2004): 181-96
War and State Formation: 
A Mennonite Critique 
By Sandra Fullerton Joireman 
Political scientists have long held opinions on state formation based on the 181 
historical experiences of European states. Key among the precepts learned from the 
European experience is that war was critical to the development of strong and ef-
fective states in Europe. While this is a troubling lesson, it is an entirely historic 
lesson and one not revived in a contemporary context until quite recently. The re-
surgence of the theory and its application to contemporary states in the developing 
world has been quite disturbing to me as a Christian and as a Mennonite, due to 
my strong objections to war and more specifically to the suggestion that war is a 
method of achieving political development. 
This paper is an attempt to tackle the theory of war as a tool of state formation. 
Though I use the tools of my discipline to refute the theory in its contemporary 
manifestation, the paper is motivated by a theological belief regarding the sinful-
ness and depravity of war. I begin the paper by thoroughly exploring the benefits 
of strong states from a comparative historical perspective, since this has been criti-
cal to the theory's revival. Then I will discuss the theory that war makes strong 
states, looking first at the work of Charles Tilly, the best-known theorist in the area 
of European state formation, then at Jeffrey Herbst's application and expansion of 
the Tilly thesis in the African context. In the second section of the paper, I will ar-
ticulate the Mennonite perspective regarding both war and the state and discuss 
why the idea of war as a tool of state formation is fundamentally problematic from 
a Christian and Mennonite perspective.1 I will also justify a rejection of the revival 
of the war and state formation theory from the viewpoint of comparative political 
science. 
Sandra F. Joireman argues that the theory that war is an effective tool of state formation is 
both morally objectionable and faulty. This essay challenges the current revival of the theory 
from both theological and empirical perspectives. Beginning with an explanation of why strong 
states are considered to be desirable, the essay examines the argument regarding state forma-
tion and the benefits of war. Theologically, Joireman argues that the theory elevates the state 
above the church and is therefore objectionable. Empirically, she argues that in this new era of 
post-modern warfare the theory is also incorrect. Ms. Joireman is an associate professor of 
politics and international relations at Wheaton College. 
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182 I. The Importance of Strong States 
The birth of the nation-state dates back to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, 
which brought an end to the Thirty Years War in Europe and established the sover-
eignty of rulers over their population. 2 From the time preceding the Treaty of 
Westphalia until about 1900, Europe was wracked by wars between European states 
that were religious and territorial in nature, such as the Napoleonic wars and the 
wars of German unification orchestrated by Otto von Bismarck. Since that time it 
has been observed that international war, in spite of all of its negative effects, helps 
states to become stronger. Indeed, scholars have long argued that wars are critical 
to state building.3 
This thesis regarding war and European state formation has been recently re-
vived and recontextualized in the work of Jeff Herbst. His award-winning book 
States and Power in Africa (2000) has taken the European state formation argument 
and masterfully applied it in the African context. Herbst has argued that the Euro-
pean pattern of state formation via international wars was able to produce strong 
states, but the African pattern of state formation without international war has not 
done so. In fact, Herbst argues that many African states are so ineffective that they 
should no longer be recognized as states but be decertified. He posits that non-state 
institutions, such as warlords, cities, or other subnational institutions might more 
effectively govern than the African states currently in their place.4 
1In choosing this topic, I am attempting to address the problem of both the fallenness of our 
institutions and our approaches to the analysis of those institutions in a fashion consistent 
with the call to the integration of faith and learning articulated by Joel Carpenter: "Our cul-
tural creations, our modes of thought, our theories, our practices, and our institutions all bear 
the marks of both God's creative genius in us and also our fallenness. By God's providence 
we and our societies are preserved and are capable of some provisionally good things. Hence, 
we can do research in the disciplines as they now exist with some assurance that good will 
come of our efforts. Yet, we should also be able to discern the ways in which they have been 
marred by our fallenness and to see the great difference between God's ways and those of 
fallen humanity. Therefore, we should also support critical approaches to the world's ways 
and means, including our disciplines." Michael S. Hamilton, Joel A. Carpenter, Dorothy F. 
Chappell, and Don W. King, "Reflection and Response: The Elusive Idea of Christian Scholar-
ship," Christian Scholar's Review 31.1(Fall2001): 13-30. 
'It is worth noting, since this is a paper from a Mennonite perspective, that sovereignty was 
established with the determination that the religion of the ruler would be the religion of the 
ruled and that Protestants and Catholics would tolerate one another. The arbitrary determi-
nation of religious belief is something that Mennonites objected to as it prevents individual 
choice with regard to faith. From the end of the Thirty Years War forward, Mennonites spe-
cifically and then Anabaptists generally were persecuted due to their belief in individual 
choice and their resistance to the state control of religion. 
3The idea that war might be beneficial rather than abhorrent is something with which political 
scientists are quite comfortable. In fact, one of the major schools of international relations, 
political realism, views war as essential, not just for reasons of security but also in pursuing 
other state goals. Carl von Clausewitz, writing in the early 1800s, noted that "War is just the 
continuation of politics via other means," an adage frequently quoted by his followers and an 
idea widely supported by political realists. 
4Here the obvious examples are the former state of Somalia, which is currently divided into 
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Why are Strong States Good? 
In the lexicon of political scientists, a strong state is an able state; it has a posi-
tive connotation. A strong state can provide an array of benefits to the people living 
within its border. Weak states cannot. Weak states are, therefore, undesirable. We 
also assume that strong states will be somehow limited. There are historic examples 
of note when states have used their strength in an unlimited fashion with the spe-
cific goal of the oppression of their own population or their neighbors. Examples of 
Nazi Germany, Stalin's Soviet Union, Cambodia under Pol Pot, and Romania un-
der Ceaucescu come immediately to mind. These states were exceptional in both 
their goals and the means they used to achieve those goals. They were strong, ex-
ceptionally so, but we do not perceive the state as used in an appropriate way and 
therefore refer to them as totalitarian or authoritarian. The leaders of Germany, the 
Soviet Union, Cambodia, and Romania did not have an encompassing interest in 
the well-being of their populations. It is not necessary for leaders to be altruistic in 
order to have an encompassing interest in their society. A leader can be solely inter-
ested in power and extraction and still have an encompassing interest in the popu-
lation of a state. 
Mancur Olson has argued that there is a critical difference in the effect of rulers 
who have a narrow interest in a society and those that have an encompassing inter-
est.5 He argues that rulers with a narrow interest will be more dangerous and dam-
aging to a society than those with an encompassing interest. It is worth pointing 
out that Olson sees both kinds of leaders as interested in extracting revenue from 
the population. The critical difference is that leaders who have an encompassing 
interest understand that the more their populace is able to produce, the more reli-
able and greater their personal take will be. Leaders with a narrow interest will 
only be concerned with taking as much as they possibly can without an eye to 
future returns, which are ultimately dependent on the well-being of the popula-
tion. Olson argues that no matter how venal they are, as long as leaders have an 
encompassing interest in the society, they will end up providing some public goods. 
Thus a government need not necessarily be "good" in order to provide critical pub-
lic goods. 
Provision of Public Goods 
Public goods are benefits that can be used by all of the citizens of the state at 
the same time, without exclusion. The three critical public goods that any state can 
provide are security, a functioning domestic market, and infrastructure. States are 
three different contested territories-Somalia, Somaliland, and Puntland-and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, which has at least two and possibly three different administrative appara-
tuses-none of them functioning effectively. 
5Mancur Olson, Power and Prosperity (New York: Basic Books, 2000). 
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184 able to provide public goods through money they acquire through taxation; there-
fore, taxation will be addressed following the discussion of public goods below. 
Personal Security. If one believes Thomas Hobbes, it is the pursuit of security 
of our persons in a world that is fraught with conflict and violence that leads us to 
desire to enter into the social contract and be citizens of a state. It then follows that 
the most critical public good that a state can provide is security. Personal security 
in this sense can also be thought of as social order by those of us used to living in 
states where order exists. I expect that tomorrow I will be able to drop my children 
off at a school run by the state where they will be safe, then drive my car unaccosted 
to work where I will be free to earn my living. I anticipate returning in the evening 
to a home that will have been protected by the state in my absence. I assume these 
things because I live in a state that provides order and security. Security is a public 
good that everyone in the society receives, whether they want to receive it or not, 
whether they pay for it or not. 6 
Strong states reduce the level of violence within the society. They do this through 
two specific functions, one institutional and one legislative. Institutionally, they 
establish courts and a judicial process that create a forum for the nonviolent resolu-
tion of conflict. If I have a dispute with my neighbor over our mutual property line, 
I can go and speak with her about it. I need not threaten her with the use of force if 
she will not resolve the dispute with me. Instead I can take her to court and we can 
rely on the coercive nature of law rather than physical violence. A forum for dis-
pute resolution may exist in societal/ cultural institutions, but these may be insuffi-
cient for issues that involve people within different communities within the state.7 
Establishing courts is critical to contract enforcement as well, a point mentioned 
above as beneficial for creating an environment in which people want to do busi-
ness. The second reason European states were able to decrease violence as they 
developed was due to the restrictions they placed on the rights of citizens to bear 
arms. By making it criminal for citizens to carry their own weapons, European states 
effectively reduced the level of violence within their societies while establishing 
the supremacy of the state.8 
Domestic Market. The second essential public good that a state provides to its 
people is a functioning domestic market. Several actions of a state enable the thriv-
ing exchange and contracting that characterize a functioning domestic market. 
'This is a generalization to be sure. There are glaring examples of neighborhoods and commu-
nities where people do not have the protection of the state in the way that I do in the comfort-
able suburb in which I live. 
'My own work in the Horn of Africa demonstrated that individuals would often avoid tradi-
tional dispute resolution mechanisms because they promote compromise. On many impor-
tant economic issues such as land ownership or rental contracts, compromise was viewed as 
insufficient and undesirable. Sandra F. Joireman, Property Rights and Political Development in 
Ethiopia and Eritrea: The State and Land, 1941-1974 (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2000). 
8Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992). 
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• A state prints money and ensures its stable rate of exchange. 185 
• A state serves as the ultimate contract enforcer, jailing, fining, or otherwise 
penalizing those who break contracts. 
• A state also regulates businesses, undergirds the banking system, and, ide-
ally, establishes and regulates a domestic stock market. 
All of these functions are provided by the state and serve as public goods. 
Citizens cannot be excluded from the benefits of a domestic market, and it is pos-
sible for all people living within the borders of a state to use the market provided 
by the state at the same time in thousands and thousands of different transactions. 
Infrastructure. The final benefit of a strong state is its ability to develop the 
internal organization of the country through the building of both physical and in-
stitutional infrastructure. States create educational, health, and administrative sys-
tems as they gain revenue in an attempt to exert control over territory and citizens. 
In its benign form, this is a tremendous benefit to citizens. However, states are not 
always benign and certainly some states have gone beyond the provision of public 
goods to the exertion of social control. The ability to which a state can provide these 
goods depends upon the condition of public finance, and this is dependent upon 
the states' ability to tax its constituency effectively. 9 
Taxation. Taxation is a critical component of state strength. Without the ability 
to collect revenue, a state will not have the resources to provide public goods, even 
the most basic public good-security. It is also the case that some forms of revenue 
collection are better than others. The most effective forms of revenue collection are 
those that achieve an optimal rate whereby all citizens pay something but not enough 
to eliminate their interest in making more money for themselves (and ultimately 
the state). 
States need money in order to survive and provide services. Money is typi-
cally gained via the taxation of citizens' income; however, there are other ways to 
gain income. One is to tax imports and exports through a customs authority. A state 
that relies on this mechanism alone or for the majority of its revenues will be taxing 
trade at a very high rate and will most likely end up negatively impacting the abil-
ity of businesses within the country to realize significant economic gains from trade. 
Another equally problematic form of taxation that has often been used in develop-
ing countries is the agricultural marketing board. Agricultural marketing boards 
serve as the exclusive buyers of agricultural products within their borders, and 
they indirectly tax producers by setting a fixed price for purchase (which is lower 
than market rates) and then exporting or selling agricultural goods domestically 
and keeping all of the profits for the state. This is one technique that weak states 
9 As a counterpoint, we can witness the current situation in Liberia, where the state is so weak 
that it has virtually ceased to function. In the capital city of Monrovia, it has become necessary 
for people to dig wells in their yards because the city municipal water supply has not worked 
in years. 
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186 have used to gain revenue from a countryside that they do not effectively control. 
Effective taxation systems identify taxpayers and elicit their compliance. They 
provide a consistent source of revenue to the state. Consistent revenue to the cen-
tral state allows the state to pay its workers as well as provide services. This is 
critical, as a well paid and disciplined coterie of state workers, whether they be 
members of the bureaucracy, police force or judiciary, is less likely to be involved in 
corruption because they have an assured livelihood. Corruption becomes intrac-
table when a state hires people to positions and then pays them irregularly or an 
insufficient amount to ensure their ability to survive without resorting to venality. 
Bribery develops as a way of life when bureaucrats, police officers, and other pub-
lic servants seek remuneration directly from the citizenry they are serving. 
States that wish to be strong and able to provide public goods to their citizenry 
and revenue to the state (for war or whatever purpose) must learn to tax their citi-
zens effectively. Margaret Levi has argued that "the history of state revenue pro-
duction is the history of the evolution of the state."10 She has also observed that 
"the greater the revenue of the state, the more possible it is to extend rule. Revenue 
enhances the ability of rulers to elaborate the institutions of the state, to bring more 
people within the domain of those institutions, and to increase the number and 
variety of collective goods provided through the state."11 While it may be difficult 
to make a population happy to be taxed, it is the case that effective taxation systems 
enable states to provide a variety of public goods to citizens. Without taxation, critical 
public goods are not provided and the door is opened for the entry of venality. If 
people need bureaucratic or civil services and those that provide them are poorly 
paid because of low state revenues, the incentive exists for bureaucrats to demand 
payment for those services beyond their salaries-to demand bribes. 
Scholars of comparative politics are more or less in agreement about the ben-
efits of strong states.12 Many scholars would also agree that it is one of the prob-
lems of the developing world that states are typically not strong enough to tax their 
citizenry effectively and as a result are unable to provide critical public goods such 
as a functioning market and security. But how strong states develop is more contro-
versial. 
II. Strong States are a Result of Warfare 
If scholars can agree on the benefits of strong states, how then does a state 
become strong? The answer, developed in the context of European political history 
10Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 2. 
11Ibid. 
12Although it is important here to reiterate the point made above, it is certainly possible for 
states to intervene in the economy and in the social and cultural institutions of a country far 
more than is necessary or desirable. The interesting contrast from the point of this paper, 
however, is those states that are unable to provide public goods, for example The Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Afghanistan, or Liberia. 
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but widely applied, is that states become strong through war. This thesis is most 187 
closely associated with the work of Charles Tilly who has famously argued that 
"War made the state and the state made war."13 Tilly's work is supported by other 
comparative political scientists such as Samuel Huntington who, in his seminal 
work on political development argued, "War is the great stimulus to state build-
ing."14 
The era of European state formation occurred from approximately 1500, when 
there were about 500 independent political entities in Europe, until 1900 when there 
were 21.15 During this period, states were engaged in the process of attempting to 
arrange the administration of territory while at the same time defending against 
foreign aggressors or trying to claim new territory for themselves. Though these 
conflicts resulted in great loss of life and costs for the population, they had some 
benefits because participation in war forced states to engage in behavior that ben-
efited their populations in the very long run. There are four specific ways in which 
war created strong states: 
1. War forced states to control their boundaries and to control the populations 
living within the state. States had to police their borders actively in order to 
determine any violations of those boundaries by other states. Additionally, war 
aided states in controlling their populations because a state at war needs people 
to fight for it; and it needs them to provide revenue to the state via taxation in 
order to pay for food for the soldiers, salaries for mercenaries (often used dur-
ing European state formation), and money for weapons and ammunition. This 
need for revenue leads us to the second impact that war had on states. 
2. War forced states to tax efficiently. The need for revenue compelled states to 
identify sources of revenue, usually its population, and then devise means of 
exploiting those revenue sources. Because the state needed all of the resources 
it could garner in order to survive and since the ruler's survival was depen-
dent on the survival of the state, incentives during times of war were struc-
tured in such a way as to make it counter to the interests of rulers to take state 
funds and use them to line their own pockets (or build themselves bigger and 
more expensive castles). 
3. War encouraged populations to see their own interests as the interests of the 
state. In other words, war developed and encouraged nationalism. European 
states, for the most part, did not develop organically out of people who saw 
themselves as unified. The states were formed by conquest over diverse popu-
lations. It was the process of war that led to a sense of unity and nationalism.16 
13Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," in The Formation of 
National States in Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly, Studies in Political Development (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 42. 
14Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1968), 123. 
15Tilly, "Reflections," 21. 
16Anthony Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, vol. 2 (Berkeley, Califor-
nia: University of California Press, 1987). 
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18 8 Nationalism strengthened states and prevented challenges to state power from 
within. Moreover, as nationalism developed, states also become less able to 
wage war because they had to respond to the interests of their populations. 
4. A process of coalition building among elites was necessary to wage a war.17 
This was particularly important during European state formation when the 
various elites would bring to the conflict the men serving under them. Coali-
tion building served as a constraint on the power of the ruler. Stronger states 
developed when rulers were not dictators, but ruled with, minimally, the con-
sent of elites and the consent, or at least acquiescence, of the population at 
large. 
War leads to effective taxation, boundary control, nationalism, and constraints on 
rulers, and for these reasons it helped strong states to develop.18 But is it desirable 
for the process of state formation in the current era? 
Jeffrey Herbst invokes the war and state formation argument; he argues that in 
the case of Africa-the area of the world with the weakest states and most ineffec-
tive governments-interstate war would have led to stronger states.19 Herbst makes 
no further normative statements regarding the future and the role war might play 
in African politics in the new century. Critical to Herbst's argument is the assump-
tion that the weak states that we currently see on the African continent are not 
effective forms of governance and that some alternative to the current state system 
must be sought to put an end to state failure in Africa . 
. . . leaders in Africa and elsewhere should end their state of denial and accept that serious 
thinking must begin regarding alternatives to at least some of the political arrangements that 
were initially demarcated by the Europeans. If they do not, the response to the ever more 
serious political and humanitarian challenges to state failure in Africa will inevitably be too 
little, too late.20 
Many African states are not providing the critical public goods that are neces-
sary for a state to be strong. Moreover, they do not effectively control the territory 
within their boundaries, and they do not tax efficiently. Ethnic groups rather than 
the state tend to be the primary form of political affiliation for citizens, and the 
leaders of many African states are authoritarian, not democratic. Herbst argues 
that ineffective states have developed in Africa in part due to the daunting geogra-
phy of the countryside, which impedes strong linkages between the urban and ru-
ral areas. When Africa was colonized, state boundaries were arbitrarily established 
at the Conference of Berlin in 1884-1885 without any regard to the ability of the 
colonizers to control the territory they were being allocated. When colonial govern-
''Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States. 
18Again, it is worth noting that a positive historic assessment of war is something with which 
most political scientists would be perfectly comfortable. 
190f course, this generalization is unfair to the few African states such as Botswana that have 
well-developed, democratic, and effective governments. 
20Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 272. 
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under their de jure administration effectively.21 
At independence, African states inherited colonial boundaries and agreed 
among themselves in the founding charter of the Organization of African Unity to 
ensure that the boundaries determined by the colonizing powers at the Berlin con-
ference remained in place. The thinking at that time was that if the boundaries were 
contested, there would be interstate wars over borders and there was a desire to 
avoid war. Interstate wars fought at that time might have strengthened the states 
that survived the wars, but they did not occur because of a consensus opinion by 
state leaders that war was not in their national interest. Since independence, Afri-
can countries have fought relatively few interstate wars but many wars within the 
borders of their states. As Herbst notes, "Thus, African politics were the exact op-
posite of traditional political science models of domestic and international politics: 
the politics between countries was extremely well-ordered (as opposed to the Hob-
besian model of international relations) while domestic politics did not evidence 
many signs of stability."22 
While falling short of advocating outright war, Herbst does propose that the 
African system of states needs to be completely redesigned so that the borders of 
states coincide with the area that they rule and we no longer see states recognized 
as sovereign over territory that they do not actually control. Herbst argues that 
states need to fail, break up, and reestablish themselves as viable entities with the 
ultimate goal being that they will become stronger and more able to provide public 
goods. Clearly, this is a process that would involve war, even though Herbst does 
not explicitly say so. He proposes that the state system in Africa should be restruc-
tured but seems to think this can happen through peaceful means, despite the fact 
that up to the present date most alternatives to the state have come about through 
violence.23 In Herbst, we see a recontextualization of the European state formation 
thesis first articulated by Tilly. War would help to form states that could stand on 
their own in terms of taxation and control over their population. Redrawing Afri-
can state boundaries would lead to stronger and more effective states. 
III. War and State Formation in the Twenty-first Century 
There are two fundamental tenets of Mennonite theology, which set it apart 
from the Reformed theology regarding the state: (1) Mennonites object to any sort 
of church alliance with the state and are instead strong proponents of individual 
21It is interesting to note that precolonial African kingdoms simply did not try to control all of 
the territory of the continent. They controlled limited geographical areas but maintained clearly 
defined property rights in people as labor, not land, was the scarce factor of production. 
22Herbst, States and Power in Africa, 109. 
23Herbst notes the succession of Somaliland as a "peaceful" transition to an alternative to the 
nation-state (Herbst, 267). This seems a rather narrow understanding of events in a country 
where political violence has been rampant for the past decade. 
Christian Scholar's Review 
190 choice in both a political and a religious sense, and (2) Mennonites are opposed to 
violence, particularly state violence in times of war. It is ironic but not surprising 
that these Mennonite ideas regarding the state developed during the period of state 
formation identified by Tilly, Huntington, and others. 
Both of these theological positions are particularly Mennonite and stem from a 
belief that the church takes precedence over every other institution in the created 
world, including the state.24 Mennonites believe that government exists in the world 
with a particular function-to provide order. Mennonites arrived at this particular 
position with regard to the state and other institutions as a result of early theologi-
cal positions that rejected the role of the state in determining people's religious 
beliefs.23 In the early years of the Reformation, Mennonites objected to forcible con-
versions of people from Catholicism to Protestantism, arguing that conversion 
should be an individual and not a political choice. It was this opposition to the role 
of state religions that led both to the persecution of Mennonites and to their strong 
conception of the church as separate from political powers. This belief about the 
role of government was reinforced by another formative experience during the 
Reformation period-a failed attempt to create a religious state based on Old Testa-
ment law in the city of Muenster in 1534-35. Lessons from the "Muenster Tragedy" 
instilled in the early Mennonite community the belief that the New Testament teach-
ing on nonviolence takes precedence over the Old Testament teachings on govern-
ment. 
Mennonites believe that the role of the state is to provide order, and the role of 
the Christian is to obey the state in its order-providing function insofar as that does 
not contradict his or her call as a Christian. It derives from both historical experi-
ence and an interpretation of Romans 13 that assumes the state does not have the 
right to command a Christian to do what God has forbidden.26 To quote John Howard 
240ne could argue from a Christian perspective that more harm is generated by the presence 
of weak states than would be caused by war. War, after all, would likely only effect one gen-
eration, whereas weak states can be devastating to generation after generation of people in a 
country because they do not encourage economic development or provide public goods. 
25The perspective that the church takes precedence over the state is yet another Mennonite 
belief that would divide the Mennonite scholar from the rest of the discipline of political 
science. 
2
'Here, to use violence. The most controversial Biblical passage addressing the role of the 
state is Romans 13:1-5, which has often been viewed by Christians as a call to obey the state in 
all matters. Mennonites have long held a suspicion of the state and interpret the same passage 
through the hermeneutical lens of Jesus' call to nonviolence in the Sermon on the Mount. The 
New International Version of Romans 13:1-5 is as follows: "Everyone must submit himself to 
the governing authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has established. 
The authorities that exist have been established by God. Consequently, he who rebels against 
the authority is rebelling against what God has instituted, and those who do so will bring 
judgment on themselves. For rulers hold no terror for those who do right, but for those who 
do wrong. Do you want to be free from fear of the one in authority? Then do what is right and 
he will commend you. For he is God's servant to do you good. But if you do wrong, be afraid, 
for he does not bear the sword for nothing. He is God's servant, an agent of wrath to bring 
punishment on the wrongdoer. Therefore, it is necessary to submit to the authorities, not only 
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Yoder on a Mennonite interpretation of Romans 13: 
God is not said to create or institute or ordain the powers that be, but only to order them, to put 
them in order, sovereignly to tell them where they belong, what is their place. It is not as if 
there was a time when there was no government and then God made government through a 
new creative intervention; there has been hierarchy and authority and power since human 
society.27 
Because it is a Mennonite belief that the state is not the Christian's fundamental 
allegiance and because Mennonites believe violence to be ultimately sinful, Men-
nonites are particularly suspicious of calls to engage in violence on behalf of the 
state. Mennonites believe that Christians live in a different reality than that faced 
by the nation-state and indeed, a different reality than that faced by non-Christians 
because they acknowledge the existence of the spiritual world and the interaction 
of that world with the temporal.28 
As a Mennonite and a political scientist, I find myself deeply suspicious of the 
purportedly value-neutral nature of political science, specifically when it addresses 
the need for war both in terms of security and in this case in terms of state build-
ing.29 There are a number of possible responses that I can make to this theory as a 
Mennonite political scientist. One would be simply to stand back from the theory 
and critique it from a purely theological perspective. Another might be to accept 
the historical usefulness of the theory and reject the modem application, again from 
a theological perspective. I prefer a third way, which is to engage the discipline 
fully on its own terms from a theological position. If I am to convince scholars of 
comparative politics that war is not an effective tool of state formation in the con-
temporary era, then I must use empirical evidence to back up my claim. 
Rethinking War and State Formation 
Arguments of political scientists regarding the role of war should not be taken 
because of possible punishment but also because of conscience." A full Mennonite interpreta-
tion of this particular text is offered in John H. Yoder, The Politics of Jesus (Grand Rapids, MI: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1972), Chapter 10. 
27Yoder, The Politics of Jesus, 203. 
28This belief about the ability of God to act in this world and limitations set on human actions 
certainly separates Mennonite political scientists from our non-Christian colleagues and from 
some of our Christian colleagues. For example, I have had numerous conversations with fel-
low pacifists who are pacifists because of a particular political belief about why we oppose 
war, and I find that we have little in common. As a Mennonite, I am opposed to war because 
I believe Jesus has commanded us to reject violence, not because I think it is the most politi-
cally effective or advantageous position. This belief sets me at odds with pacifists who are 
coming from the political left and with Christian colleagues who support Just War theories. 
29ln this regard, I imagine that I fit Thomas Heilke's model of Mennonite political scientists 
(all ten of us). Thomas W. Heilke, "At the Table? Toward an Anabaptist Political Science," in 
The Re-Enchantment of Political Science, eds. Thomas W. Heilke and Ashley Woodiwiss (New 
York: Lexington Books, 2001). 
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19 2 lightly. We should be careful to count the cost of these ideas particularly insofar as 
they have the potential to have an impact outside of the academy in the policy-
making community. Tilly examines war purely in the historical context and makes 
note of the fact that he doubts the applicability of his theory to the current political 
era.30 Herbst also appears to be motivated by a desire to see strong governments in 
place in Africa, anticipating the positive benefits that will come about from the 
peace and stability that they will bring. Yet Herbst is assuming too much in believ-
ing (1) that transitions will occur peacefully and (2) that the governing units that 
emerge will be constructive rather than destructive. The uncertainty and political 
violence that would necessarily come about from any radical change in the state 
system in Africa is so dangerous that the suggestion seems to me to be morally 
reprehensible. If I believed, as many of my colleagues in the discipline do, that war 
might be developmental for these states, my discomfort with the uncertainty re-
sulting from a change in state boundaries would be far weaker. 
At least one serious flaw becomes apparent in any reasoning that attempts to 
use the European state formation thesis in the contemporary world. The type of 
war that developed Europe no longer exists today-wars are more lethal, global-
ized, and less ordered. Indeed, rather than wars in the developing world becoming 
more like European wars, quite the opposite is occurring and European wars are 
becoming more like those in the developing world with the involvement of non-
combatants and spillover effects to other states in terms of refugee flows. 
Postmodern War 
When writing his seminal work on state development in Europe, Tilly noted 
that although war served a critical function in building states in the European con-
text, it was not a role that could be repeated in other contexts. Tilly argued that "the 
European state-building experiences will not repeat themselves in new states. The 
connections of the new states to the rest of the world have changed too much."31 In 
attempting to apply Tilly's theory of war and state formation to the Middle East, 
Steven Heydemann and his collaborators were frustrated, not by the absence of 
war, but by the fact that taxation was not used to fund the war. Therefore the state 
did not become stronger through war. Instead, wars and external threats led to the 
buildup of the military via grants of military equipment and training from abroad, 
alleviating the need for large domestic taxation and ultimately undermining any 
30In fairness to both Herbst and Tilly, I don't believe either of them would naively argue that 
war is good in the fashion that it was entertained as a policy option prior to WWI in Europe. 
In fact, Tilly explicitly acknowledges the costs of war saying, " ... the building of states in 
Western Europe cost tremendously in death, suffering, loss of rights and unwilling surrender 
of land, goods or labor" ("Reflections," 71). Herbst is less explicit, but appears to be weighing 
the costs of weak states, which in Africa have been tremendously high, against the costs of 
war. 
31Tilly, "Reflections," 81. 
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constraints on authoritarian states.32 In Iraq, the state was in virtually a constant 193 
state of war through the 1980s, but no constraints on the ruler developed and the 
people did not become more nationalistic. Instead, the wars were funded via oil 
revenue and few of the expected benefits derived. In these cases, Tilly was correct: 
globalization and the effect of the international market prevented states from gain-
ing the "benefits" of war. 
There is further reason to challenge the relevance of the war-state formation 
link. It is not just the changes in the world system of states that make the relation-
ship between war and state formation unlikely to hold true in the current era, but 
also changes in the nature of warfare. War today takes a different form than during 
the time of European state formation. There are numerous advances in technology 
and the financing of war that have altered warfare and undermined the potential 
gains from war that might strengthen a state. In this next section I will be drawing 
heavily on the conception of postmodern warfare that has been articulated by Mary 
Kaldor in her book New and Old Wars. 33 
Wars in the post-Cold War era are fought in a distinctly different fashion than 
they have been fought in the past. Kaldor labels them postmodern because they are 
of a different cloth than previous wars. We expect that technological and method-
ological changes in warfare will always be making wars more efficient than before. 
What is new in this conception of postmodern warfare is that civilians are the tar-
gets of warfare and war is financed through means other than taxation. Kaldor 
argues that globalization and privatization have eroded the monopoly on the use 
of force that used to be characteristic of the state. During the era of state formation 
in Europe and even during the Cold War, it was the case that states fought their 
own conflicts with members of their armed forces targeting the armed forces of 
other states. 34 As a result, at the turn of the hventieth century, the ratio of military to 
civilian deaths in warfare was 8 to 1. Since the 1990s, this has been reversed with 
the ratio of military to civilian casualties now 1to8.35 In postmodern warfare, civil-
ians rather than military personnel are the targets. They are also the soldiers. 36 This 
inverting of casualty figures has come as a result of the targeting of civilians in so 
many outbreaks of conflict. 
32Steven Heydemann, War, Institutions and Social Change in the Middle East (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 2000). 
33Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 1999). 
34During the era of European state formation, it was certainly the case that mercenaries were 
frequently used to augment and sometimes even replace members of the armed forces of a 
state, but this would not be inconsistent with Kaldor's view. 
35Kaldor, New and Old Wars. Kaldor is writing about the context of the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia, which began as a civil war, but expanded to become an international war as the 
state collapsed. 
36 Armed gangs, vigilante groups, and other civilians-people outside of the military chain of 
command-have provided the manpower for the Bosnian War and the other Yugoslav wars 
of secession, the war in Afghanistan, and conflicts in the Great Lakes region of Africa. 
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dresses. In many of the wars of the past twenty years on the African continent, 
civilians rather than members of the armed forces of other states have been the 
targets. 37 Moreover, it is also the case that civilians have been the perpetrators of 
violence, and on the African continent, these civilians have often been children co-
erced into violence via threat and/ or abduction.38 When violence is conducted by 
civilians and targeted at civilians, it is unlikely to serve the purposes of state forma-
tion envisioned in the war-state formation theory. Rather than controlling the popu-
lation within a state, postmodern warfare is most likely to create incentives that 
lead people to flee the state in pursuit of their own security. Not surprisingly, it is 
the case that postmodern warfare fought in Africa has led to tremendous refugee 
problems as people leave their state to seek personal security in another. Liberian 
refugees fled their country when the civil war began in 1989 and are living through-
out West Africa waiting for their state to become safe again.39 However, that same 
war spread to Guinea and Sierra Leone. Similarly, a civil war that began in Rwanda 
with genocide spreading to neighboring states such as the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo. Postmodern wars can be either civil or international; it is increasingly 
difficult to draw sharp lines between the two. 
When the state ceases to protect its citizens and citizens become substitutes for 
the armed forces, there is a clear failure of the Hobbesian social contract in which 
individuals sacrifice their liberty to live under the rule of a state in exchange for 
security. Further, it is difficult to determine how a state will gain in terms of the 
ability to tax a population (one of the presumed benefits of war) when the popula-
tion is no longer present because they had to flee for safety. 
The war-state formation theory posits that war leads to stronger states because 
states are forced by war to tax more effectively and use their resources more effi-
ciently. Apart from the problem of population loss explained above, there is an-
other problem in this era of postmodern war, particularly in the African continent: 
wars in Africa are not financed by taxation nor even by theft and plunder of the 
population, but from the exploitation of natural resources. In Sierra Leone, Angola, 
and Mozambique, diamonds have fueled conflicts between groups, across borders, 
and within states. In the Congo the exploitation of timber and koltan has funded 
conflict. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler have argued that the presence of valuable 
natural resources in a state is likely to be a destabilizing factor and to contribute to 
370ne example is the conflict that developed along the Sudanese/Ugandan border due to the 
activities of the Lords Resistance Army (LRA). The LRA was composed predominantly of 
civilians and attacked civilians, wreaking havoc on the lives of many Ugandans and Sudanese 
and only involving the governments of those countries in the most peripheral way. See Heike 
Behrend, Alice Lakwena and Holy Spirits (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1999). 
38The most tragic and well-documented cases of this type of violence involving child soldiers 
has taken place in Sierra Leone and in Uganda, but these are by no means the only examples. 
39Renewed fighting in 2002 has made it unlikely that Liberia will be a safe place to live for 
sometime. 
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array of valuable resources from mineral deposits to timber to oil.41 If postmodern 
wars are funded by the exploitation of natural resources, then they will thrive on 
the African continent. Insofar as the exploitation of resources is used to fund con-
flicts, it is not necessary for states either to be strong or to become strong in order to 
fight wars. Thus, the idea that interstate war would strengthen the states on the 
African continent seems unlikely due to the way wars have been financed in Africa 
over the past twenty years. Yet we need not limit our focus to Africa. The war in 
Afghanistan prior to U.S. involvement was largely financed through the trafficking 
of opium. The Bosnian War and the war in Kosovo targeted civilians and were 
financed by theft and extortion. 
IV. Conclusion 
The lessons learned by examining the long history of state formation are dis-
turbing. It is disquieting to see how long it took for states to consolidate effectively 
in the European context. Four hundred years and multiple wars led to the small 
number of stable states we now see in Europe. It is also unsettling to see the ben-
efits that accrued to states as a result of their willingness to use violence in pursuit 
of their political agendas. We look to the developing world and rightly ask how can 
these states develop quickly? We cannot appropriate the answers from Europe. 
Though comparative historical analysis can be useful, I am unconvinced that the 
European context can give us useful lessons for the strengthening of states in the 
developing world. The changed nature of warfare makes the use of warfare as a 
tool of state formation both impracticable and, from the Mennonite perspective, 
immoral. 
What we can learn from comparative historical analysis is that constraints on 
rulers are critical to state development, effective taxation is necessary for the provi-
sion of public goods, and the control of populations is critical to state strength. 
Historically, war has helped to achieve these benefits to society, but at a tremen-
dous cost that cannot be ignored. Because taxation does not finance the wars that 
we see around the world, it is not necessary for states to become stronger and more 
complex in order to control people and better extract resources. Indeed, the fueling 
of conflict via the extraction of natural resources, particularly in wars on the Afri-
can continent, has made African states more marginalized than they have been in 
the past. Strong states in Africa would mean the potential for better governments 
40Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "On Economic Causes of Civil War," Oxford Economic Papers 
50.4 (1998): 563-74. They have noted that the presence of natural resources in a state is likely to 
encourage the development of civil wars because the potential payoffs are much higher than 
in states that are resource poor. 
41Recent evidence from Somalia, a country that has been destroyed by years of fighting with-
out a state, indicates that they are exporting their forests in the form of charcoal to the Middle 
East. 
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196 and the provision of public goods to citizens. However, means other that warfare 
should be sought, and indeed are being sought, to strengthen states. 
A Mennonite perspective rejects war as a means to state development and raises 
a set of concerns regarding war that lead me to challenge this approach to political 
development. We are called by the prophet Amos to "seek good, not evil and to 
hate evil and love good (Amos 5:14, 15). I believe that this call, along with New 
Testament teachings on both government and violence, forces us to reject the use of 
war in pursuit of state development. War, with all of the harm it brings to Chris-
tians and non-Christians alike, can never be justified as a means of state buildingY 
42My thanks go to P. J. Hill, Alan Jacobs, and Ashley Woodiwiss for their comments on this 
paper. The mistakes remain my own. 
